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Peter Carruthers (ed.)
New York: Oxford University Press New York (2005)
This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, concerns the fundamental architecture of the mind, addressing such question as: What capacities, processes, representations, biases, and connections are innate? How do these innate elements feed into a story about the development of our mature cognitive capacities, and which of them are shared with other members of the animal kingdom? The editors have provided an introduction giving some of the background to debates about innateness and introducing each of the subsequent essays, as well as a consolidated bibliography that will be a valuable reference resource for all those interested in this area. The volume will be of great importance to all researchers and students interested in the fundamental nature and powers of the human mind. Together, the three volumes in the series will provide the most intensive and richly cross-disciplinary investigation of nativism ever undertaken. They point the way toward a synthesis of nativist work that promises to provide a new understanding of our minds and their place in the natural order.
|Keywords||Cognition Innateness Language Metaphysics Mind Motivation|
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|Buy the book||$0.94 used (98% off) $35.56 new (16% off) $41.95 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.I56 2005|
|ISBN(s)||0195179994 0195179676 9780195179675|
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Susan A. Gelman, Psychological Models Often Assume That Young Children Learn Words and Concepts Bymeansof Associative Learning Mechanisms, Without the Need to Posit Any Innate Predispositions. For Example, Smith, Jones, and Landau (1996) Propose That Children Learn Concepts by Hearing Speciﬁc Linguistic Frames While Viewing Speciﬁc Object Properties. The Environment Provides All the Information That Children Need; the Conjunction of Sights and Sounds is Proposed to Be Sufﬁcient to Enable Children. [REVIEW]
Daniel J. Povinelli, Christopher G. Prince & Todd M. Preuss, Parent-Offspring Conflict and the Development of Social Understanding.
Tom Simpson, Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich, Introduction: Nativism Past and Present.
Strong Versus Weak, Other Camp Doesn't Really Understand Darwin or Evolution; Both Routinely Pay Homage to George Williams's (1966) Modest Use of Adaptationism.
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Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2008). Darwin's Mistake: Explaining the Discontinuity Between Human and Nonhuman Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):109-130.
Angeles Eraña (2012). Dual Process Theories Versus Massive Modularity Hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):855-872.
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Ángeles Eraña & Robert Stainton (2010). The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27.
Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2008). Darwin's Triumph: Explaining the Uniqueness of the Human Mind Without a Deus Ex Machina. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):153-178.
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