The phenomenal concept strategy

Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):212-236 (2007)
A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,661
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Bernard Molyneux (2011). On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

241 ( #5,758 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

24 ( #37,511 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.