The Reality of Causes in a World of Instrumental Laws
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:38 - 48 (1980)
| Abstract | Philosophers of science nowadays are inclined to believe in physical laws, but generally, like Hume and Russell, to reject causes. This paper urges the reverse. Explanatory practice in physics argues that we must take literally the causal stories that our theories provide, but the fundamental laws and equations that are essential to modern science are merely instrumental. | |||||||||
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