Noûs 45 (2):315-327 (2011)
|Abstract||David Lewis (1986) criticizes moderate views of composition on the grounds that a restriction on composition must be vague, and vague composition leads, via a precisificational theory of vagueness, to an absurd vagueness of existence. I show how to resist this argument. Unlike the usual resistance, however, I do not jettison precisificational views of vagueness. Instead, I blur the connection between composition and existence that Lewis assumes. On the resulting view, in troublesome cases of vague composition, there is an object, which definitely exists, about which it is vague whether the relevant borderline parts compose it.|
|Keywords||composition argument from vagueness David Lewis vagueness universalism|
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