Will I be a dead person?

Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson’s favored Biological View of personal identity
Keywords Embryo  Fetus  Person  Personal Identity  Science  Olson, E
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DOI 10.2307/2653464
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Crawford L. Elder (2007). Conventionalism and the World as Bare Sense-Data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.
Robert Allen (2000). Identity and Becoming. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):527-548.

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