Will I Be a Dead Person?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167 - 171 (1999)
| Abstract | Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity in mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson's favored Biological View of personal identity | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesWilliam R. Carter (1999). Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167-171.
Eric T. Olson (1997). Was I Ever a Fetus? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151-159.
David Hershenov (2005). Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity? Mind 114 (453):31 - 59.
Anthony Serafini (1990). Callahan on Harming the Dead. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:329-339.
David Mackie (1999). Personal Identity and Dead People. Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-42.
Johan E. Gustafsson (2010). Did Locke Defend the Memory Continuity Criterion of Personal Identity? Locke Studies 10:113–129.
David B. Hershenov (2001). Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity? Mind 114 (453):31-59.
J. Jeremy Wisnewski (2009). What We Owe the Dead. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):54-70.
Christopher Buford (2009). Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity. Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.
R. S. Downie (2003). Research on Dead Infants. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 24 (2).
Anthony Preus (1984). Respect for the Dead and Dying. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (4):409-416.
Niall Connolly (2011). How the Dead Live. Philosophia 39 (1):83-103.
Patrick Toner (2011). On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):454-473.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-01-09Total downloads17 ( #71,199 of 549,700 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,700 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
