Will I Be a Dead Person?

Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson’s favored Biological View of personal identity
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DOI 10.2307/2653464
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Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
Crawford L. Elder (2007). Conventionalism and the World as Bare Sense-Data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.

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