Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox

Theoria 77 (2):180-193 (2011)
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently, Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers the motivation for a type-theoretic approach with respect to the Knowability Paradox alone, there is no substantive philosophical motivation to type knowledge, except that of solving the paradox. Every attempt to independently justify the typing of knowledge is doomed to failure
Keywords epistemic paradoxes  type theory  Knowability Paradox
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01100.x
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Alexander Paseau (2008). Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (2):153-176.

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David DeVidi & Tim Kenyon (2003). Analogues of Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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