Analyzing a priori knowledge

Philosophical Studies 142 (1):77 - 90 (2009)
Abstract
There are four approaches to analyzing the concept of a priori knowledge. The primary target of the reductive approach is the concept of a priori justification. The primary target of the nonreductive approach is the concept of a priori knowledge. There are two approaches to analyzing each primary target. A theory-neutral approach provides an analysis that does not presuppose any general theory of knowledge or justification. A theory-laden approach provides an analysis that does presuppose some general theory of knowledge or justification . Those who embrace a theory-laden analysis incur a special burden: they must separate the features of their analysis that are constitutive of the a priori from those that are constitutive of the background theory. My goal is to illustrate how the failure to separate these features leads to erroneous conclusions about the nature of a priori knowledge
Keywords A priori  Knowledge  Justification  Warrant  Indefeasible  Nonexperiential  Intuition  Reliabilism  Socio-historicism
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References found in this work BETA
Albert Casullo (1988). Revisability, Reliabilism, and a Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):187-213.

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