David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55 (2012)
I argue that evaluating the knowledge norm of practical reasoning is less straightforward than is often assumed in the literature. In particular, cases in which knowledge is intuitively present, but action is intuitively epistemically unwarranted, provide no traction against the knowledge norm. The knowledge norm indicates what it is appropriately to hold a particular content as a reason for action; it does not provide a theory of what reasons are sufficient for what actions. Absent a general theory about what sorts of reasons, if genuinely held, would be sufficient to justify actions—a question about which the knowledge norm is silent—many of the kinds of cases prevalent in the literature do not bear on the knowledge norm.
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References found in this work BETA
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley (2008). Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Timothy Williamson (2005). Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
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Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Belief Without Credence. Synthese:1-29.
Dustin Locke (2015). Practical Certainty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):72-95.
Dustin Locke (2014). Knowledge Norms and Assessing Them Well. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):80-89.
Masashi Kasaki (2014). Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge. Acta Analytica 29 (1):83-98.
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