Knowing What You Believe

Abstract
A familiar claim is that knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes is normally immediate, that is, not normally based on observation, inference or evidence. One explanation of the possibility of immediate self-knowledge turns on the transparency of the question ‘Do I believe that P?’ to the question ‘Is it the case that P?’ This paper explains why occurrent mental states such as passing thoughts do not fall within the purview of the transparency account and proposes a different account of how we know our own passing thoughts. It is also argued that the transparency account fails to explain how knowledge of our own beliefs can be psychologically or epistemically immediate. Finally, questions are raised about the presumption that knowledge of our own beliefs is epistemically immediate
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    References found in this work BETA
    Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. In Christopher S. Hill (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. University of Arkansas Press. 5--26.
    Tyler Burge (1988). Individualism and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
    Alex Byrne (2008). Knowing That I Am Thinking. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

    View all 20 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Nicholas Silins (2013). Introspection and Inference. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.
    Similar books and articles
    Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
    Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief. In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Julie Germein (2012). Two Objections to Moran's Transparency Account. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):735-740.
    Robert Dunn (1998). Knowing What I'm About to Do Without Evidence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):231 – 252.
    Quassim Cassam (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.
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