Truth and truthfulness attributions

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):295–320 (2005)
Abstract
A good reason to have a language containing a truth-predicate is that it makes it possible to formulate 'truthfulness attributions' (statements like 'What Mary will tell you about her findings in the cavern will be true') and that truthfulness attributions are of great help in the transmission of true beliefs, the latter being, of course, a desirable end in itself. I argue that, given a language and a conceptual system more or less like ours, truthfulness attributions cannot be effectively replaced by other kinds of statements
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