David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 71 (1):3 - 18 (2009)
I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless. I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is insufficient to account for its epistemological distinctiveness.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (2002). The Sources of Belief. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Quassim Cassam (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.
Quassim Cassam (2007). Ways of Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):339 - 358.
Daniel C. Dennet (ed.) (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Bradford Books.
Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
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