The basis of self-knowledge

Erkenntnis 71 (1):3 - 18 (2009)
I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless. I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is insufficient to account for its epistemological distinctiveness.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Quassim Cassam (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.
    Quassim Cassam (2007). Ways of Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):339 - 358.
    Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

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