Two kinds of knowing in Plato, Cervantes, and Aristotle

Philosophy and Literature 24 (2):406-423 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This essay argues that Cervantes engages and responds to the Platonic critique of mimesis through a tradition that is rooted in Aristotle's _Nicomachean Ethics. Especially in _Don Quixote, the standard by which mimesis is judged in Platonic terms is replaced by notions of the fitting, the just, and the appropriate, which draw on Aristotelian notions of practical reasoning. These had been promulgated by Renaissance rhetoricians and in proverbial discourse. Cervantes finds these traditions particularly well-suited to discourse in the novel, which attempts to render the unevenness of ordinary experience. In recognizing the irreducible heterogeneity of experience and the priority of translation over analysis, the novel accomplishes important political work

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
94 (#176,872)

6 months
20 (#119,793)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references