Buridan's consequentia: consequence and inference within a token-based semantics

History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):277-297 (2005)
I examine the theory of consequentia of the medieval logician, John Buridan. Buridan advocates a strict commitment to what we now call proposition-tokens as the bearers of truth-value. The analysis of Buridan's theory shows that, within a token-based semantics, amendments to the usual notions of inference and consequence are made necessary, since pragmatic elements disrupt the semantic behaviour of propositions. In my reconstruction of Buridan's theory, I use some of the apparatus of modern two-dimensional semantics, such as two-dimensional matrices and the distinction between the context of formation and the context of evaluation of utterances
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DOI 10.1080/01445340500211173
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred Tarski (2002). On the Concept of Following Logically. History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):155-196.
Stephen Read (1994). Formal and Material Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (3):247 - 265.

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Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2003). John Buridan and Jerónimo Pardo on the Notion of Propositio. In R. L. Friedman & S. Ebbesen (eds.), John Buridan and Beyond. Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters 89--153.
Gyula Klima (2009). John Buridan. Oxford University Press.

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