Evidence and intuition

Episteme 9 (4):311-328 (2012)
Many philosophers accept a view according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: it is consistent with a wide range of views about not only philosophical evidence but also the nature of evidence in general, including Williamson's famous view that E = K; it can maintain the central claims about the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy made by proponents of the intuition picture; it does not collapse into Williamson's own deflationary view of the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy; and it does not lead to scepticism
Keywords Epistemology of Philosophy  Intuition  Metaphilosophy  Evidence  Methodology  Williamson
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2012.21
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