Knowing How Without Knowing That

In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. 113 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view illustrates that even if the arguments given here succeed it might still be reasonable to hold that knowing how to do something is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation.
Keywords Knowledge How  Knowledge That  Intellectualism  Stanley and Williamson  Seemings  Gettier  justification  intentional action  belief
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    Yuri Cath (2013). Regarding a Regress. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.
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