Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 66 (3):473 (1999)
|Abstract||There seem to be some very good reasons for a philosopher of science to be a deductivist about scientific reasoning. Deductivism is apparently connected with a demand for clarity and definiteness in the reconstruction of scientists' reasonings. And some philosophers even think that deductivism is the way around the problem of induction. But the deductivist image is challenged by cases of actual scientific reasoning, in which hard-to-state and thus discursively ill-defined elements of thought nonetheless significantly condition what practitioners accept as cogent argument. And arguably, these problem cases abound. For example, even geometry--for most of its history--was such a problem case, despite its exactness and rigor. It took a tremendous effort on the part of Hilbert and others, to make geometry fit the deductivist image. Looking to the empirical sciences, the problems seem worse. Even the most exact and rigorous of empirical sciences--mechanics--is still the kind of problem case which geometry once was. In order for the deductivist image to fit mechanics, Hilbert's sixth problem (for mechanics) would need to be solved. This is a difficult, and perhaps ultimately impossible task, in which the success so far achieved is very limited. I shall explore some consequences of this for realism as well as for deductivism. Through discussing links between non-monotonicity, skills, meaning, globality in cognition, models, scientific understanding, and the ideal of rational unification, I argue that deductivists can defend their image of scientific reasoning only by trivializing it, and that for the adequate illumination of science, insights from anti-deductivism are needed as much as those which come from deductivism|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brent Mundy (1990). On Empirical Interpretation. Erkenntnis 33 (3):345 - 369.
Andrew Chrucky, The Manifest Image ≠ the Commonsense Conceptual Framework (in the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars).
Franz Huber (2005). Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
C. Kenneth Waters (1987). Relevance Logic Brings Hope to Hypothetico-Deductivism. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):453-464.
C. Hasok (1995). The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):121-136.
Peter Achinstein (ed.) (2004). Science Rules: A Historical Introduction to Scientific Methods. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Luca Moretti (2006). The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism Versus Hypothetico-Deductivism. Erkenntnis 64 (1):115-138.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #71,470 of 751,029 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #62,892 of 751,029 )
How can I increase my downloads?