Regarding a Regress

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388 (2013)
Abstract
Is there a successful regress argument against intellectualism? In this article I defend the negative answer. I begin by defending Stanley and Williamson's (2001) critique of the contemplation regress against Noë (2005). I then identify a new argument – the employment regress – that is designed to succeed where the contemplation regress fails, and which I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism. However, I argue that the employment regress still fails. Drawing on the previous discussion, I criticise further regress arguments given by Hetherington (2006) and Noë (2005)
Keywords Knowledge How  Ryle  Knowledge That  Intellectualism  Regress
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12004
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References found in this work BETA
Jason Stanley (2011). Know How. Oxford University Press.
Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and Subdoxastic States. Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518.

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Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2015). Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):799-816.

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