Perspectives on Science 15 (2):131-177 (2007)
|Abstract||: The distinction between science and philosophy plays a central role in methodological, programmatic and institutional debates. Discussions of disciplinary identities typically focus on boundaries or else on genealogies, yielding models of demarcation and models of dynamics. Considerations of a discipline's self-image, often based on history, often plays an important role in the values, projects and practices of its members. Recent focus on the dynamics of scientific change supplements Kuhnian neat model with a role for philosophy and yields a model of the evolution of philosophy of science. This view illuminates important aspects of science and itself contributes to philosophy of science. This interactive model is general yet based on exclusive attention to physics. In this paper and two sequels, I focus on the human sciences and argue that their role in the history of philosophy of science is just as important and it also involves a close involvement of the history of philosophy. The focus is on Gestalt psychology and it points to some lessons for philosophy of science. But, unlike the discussion of natural sciences, the discussion here brings out more complication than explication, and skews certain kinds of generalizations|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Lawrence Sklar (2001). What Is an Isolated System? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:51-57.
Margaret Morrison (2007). Where Have All the Theories Gone? Philosophy of Science 74 (2):195-228.
P. Sven Arvidson (1998). Bringing Context Into Focus: Parallels in the Psychology of Attention and the Philosophy of Science. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 29 (1):50-91.
Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (1994). Folk Psychology. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.
Barry Gholson (ed.) (1989). Psychology of Science: Contributions to Metascience. Cambridge University Press.
Kenneth F. Schaffner (1986). Exemplar Reasoning About Biological Models and Diseases: A Relation Between the Philosophy of Medicine and Philosophy of Science. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11 (1):63-80.
Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (2002). Folk Psychology. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
Edmond L. Wright (1992). Gestalt-Switching: Hanson, Aronson and Harre. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):480-86.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #55,623 of 722,771 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,771 )
How can I increase my downloads?