Still epiphenomenal qualia: Response to Muller

Philosophia 37 (1):105-107 (2009)
Abstract
Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
Keywords Franks Jackson  Qualia  Epiphenomenalism  Higher-order thought
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
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