Philosophia 37 (1):105-107 (2009)
|Abstract||Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.|
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