The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy

Oxford University Press (1979)
This reissue of an American philosophical classic includes a new preface by Cavell, in which he discusses the work's reception and influence. The work fosters a fascinating relationship between philosophy and literature both by augmenting his philosophical discussions with examples from literature and by applying philosophical theories to literary texts. Cavell also succeeds in drawing some very important parallels between the British analytic tradition and the continental tradition, by comparing skepticism as understood in Descartes, Hume, and Kant with philosophy of language as practiced by Wittgenstein and Austin.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Skepticism  Ethics
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Call number BD161.C355 1999
ISBN(s) 019513107X   9780195131079  
DOI 10.2307/2219122
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Michael Rescorla (2009). Assertion and its Constitutive Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.

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