Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):136-170 (2009)
|Abstract||I argue against Rawls's claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy would be selected in the original position in addition to a democratic principle. Since a religious democracy could satisfy the democratic principle, the parties in the original position would not exclude it as illegitimate.|
|Keywords||Political Liberalism Secularism Political Legitimacy John Rawls Liberal Principle of Legitimacy Religion|
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