A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences

History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (3):227-261 (2008)
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Abstract

Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in self-referential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12th to the 15th century) and the last 100 years. In this paper, I undertake a comparative taxonomy of these two traditions. I outline and discuss eight main approaches to Liar sentences in the medieval tradition, and compare them to the most influential modern approaches to such sentences. I also emphasize the aspects of each tradition that find no counterpart in the other one. It is expected that such a comparison may point in new directions for future research on the paradoxes; indeed, the present analysis allows me to draw a few conclusions about the general nature of Liar sentences, and to identify aspects that would require further investigation

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Citations of this work

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
The Byzantine Liar.Stamatios Gerogiorgakis - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (4):313-330.
William heytesbury.John Longeway - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Chrysippus Confronts the Liar: The Case for Stoic Cassationism.Michael Papazian - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):197-214.

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References found in this work

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Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.

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