Le «pan-propositionnalisme» de Jean wyclif

Vivarium 43 (1):124-155 (2005)
This paper shows how Wyclif is able at the same time (i) to claim that whatever is is a proposition ("pan-propositionalism") and (ii) to develop a nontrivial theory of propositional truth and falsity. The study has two parts: 1) Starting from Wyclif's fivefold propositional typology – including a propositio realis (real proposition) and asic esse sicut propositio significat (a fact) – we will analyse(a) the three different kinds of real predication, (b) the distinction between primary and secondary signification of propositions (the latter being an instantiation of the former) and (c) the status of logical truth as opposed to (but depending on) metaphysical truth. Furthermore, the notion of ens logicum (as intermediate between statements and facts) will be compared to Walter Burley's propositio in re of which it appears to be a close analogon. 2) The second part deals with two semantic and metaphysical implications of the "pan-propositionalism": (a) the extended notion of being (ampliatio entis) called upon to explain the truth of so-called non-standard propositions (e.g. past, future, modal) and (b) the relation between contents of the divine mind as "arch-truth-makers" and eternal as well as contingent truths.
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DOI 10.1163/1568534054068384
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