Approaching the truth via belief change in propositional languages
In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer (2010)
| Abstract | Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of theory change are the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude (PPV for short) and the AGM theory of belief change (AGM for short). In this paper, we will investigate the conceptual relations between PPV and AGM and, in particular, we will ask whether the AGM rules for theory change are effective means for approaching the truth, i.e., for achieving the cognitive aim of science pointed out by PPV. First, the key ideas of PPV and AGM and their application to a particular kind of propositional theories - the so called "conjunctive propositions" - will be illustrated. Afterwards, we will prove that, as far as conjunctive propositions are concerned, AGM belief change is an effective tool for approaching the truth. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesGustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2011). Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories. Erkenntnis 75 (2):183-202.
Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott (1995). How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):361-380.
Jake Chandler (2012). Transmission Failure, AGM-Style. Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
Gustavo Cevolani (forthcoming). Truth Approximation Via Abductive Belief Change. Logic Journal of the IGPL.
Oliver Schulte (1999). Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle. Synthese 118 (3):329-361.
Mark Jago (2006). Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction. In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer.
Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco (1999). Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery). Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
Hans Rott (2011). Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.
Thomas Andreas Meyer, Willem Adrian Labuschagne & Johannes Heidema (2000). Infobase Change: A First Approximation. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (3):353-377.
Neil Tennant (1997). Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Reply to My Critics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):569-586.
Wolfgang Spohn (1988). Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States. In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer.
Thomas Meyer (2001). Basic Infobase Change. Studia Logica 67 (2):215-242.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-09-06Total downloads20 ( #61,642 of 551,055 )Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #6,964 of 551,055 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
