Plural Values and Heterogeneous Situations. Considerations on the Scope for a Political Theory of Justice.

This article aims to investigate the way in which a political theory of justice should respond to the endorsement of pluralism. After offering reasons in support of the necessity for such a theory to take pluralism seriously, an argument is put forward for its characterization in minimal and procedural terms. However, taking issue with the straightforward relationship of implication identified by a number of scholars between pluralism and procedural justice, this article contends that a direct relation can only be established between pluralism and the need to define a minimal theory of justice, i.e. a theory that assumes as little as possible in terms of values and views of the world. Its procedural formulation is seen, instead, as a consequence of the limited predictive power of theory facing the heterogeneous situations with which it is expected to deal.
Keywords Procedural justice  pluralism  minimalism
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DOI 10.1177/1474885107077325
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Emanuela Ceva (2012). Beyond Legitimacy. Can Proceduralism Say Anything Relevant About Justice? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2):183-200.

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