|Abstract||As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number of these constraints will be satisfied if and only if acceptable sentences are true under all valuations in a distinguished non-empty set W. Drawing inspiration from distance-based aggregation procedures, various scoring rule based membership conditions for W are discussed and a possible point of contact with ranking theory is considered. The paper closes with various suggestions for further research.|
|Keywords||scoring rules ranking functions probability model coarsening / refinement distance-based aggregation acceptance lottery paradox|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Frederik Herzberg & Daniel Eckert (2012). Impossibility Results for Infinite-Electorate Abstract Aggregation Rules. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):273-286.
Martin Smith (2010). A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.
Christian List (2012). The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review. Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger (2012). Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth. Synthese 187 (1):209-221.
Franz Dietrich Christian List, The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List, The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.
Marc Pauly (2005). Changing the Rules of Play. Topoi 24 (2):209-220.
Added to index2011-12-20
Total downloads64 ( #14,354 of 549,117 )
Recent downloads (6 months)25 ( #2,023 of 549,117 )
How can I increase my downloads?