Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules

Erkenntnis 78 (1):201 - 217 (2013)
As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number of these constraints will be satisfied if and only if acceptable sentences are true under all valuations in a distinguished non-empty set W. Drawing inspiration from distance-based aggregation procedures, various scoring rule based membership conditions for W are discussed and a possible point of contact with ranking theory is considered. The paper closes with various suggestions for further research.
Keywords scoring rules  ranking functions  probability  model coarsening / refinement  distance-based aggregation  acceptance  lottery paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9375-6
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References found in this work BETA
Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson (2006). Generalizing the Lottery Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
Martin Smith (2010). A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.

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