Actuality and knowability

Analysis 71 (3):411-419 (2011)
Abstract
It is widely believed that for all p, or at least for all entertainable p, it is knowable a priori that (p iff actually p). It is even more widely believed that for all such p, it is knowable that (p iff actually p). There is a simple argument against these claims from four antecedently plausible premises.
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    Jonathan Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422-428.
    Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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