Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation

Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61 (2001)
Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes . Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no
Keywords Analysis  Conceptualism  Explanation  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Reduction  Truth
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-110-3-315
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Panu Raatikainen (2014). Chalmers' Blueprint of the World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):113-128.
Kelly Trogdon (2013). Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Michael J. Raven (2015). Ground. Philosophy Compass 10 (5):322-333.

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