Content-free pictorial realism

Philosophical Studies 135 (3):375 - 405 (2007)
Abstract
What is it for a picture to be more realistic, or more depictive, than another? Without committing to any thesis as to what depiction consists in, I show that degrees of depictiveness are grounded in a certain relation between two basic kinds of differences between pictures: configurational differences and content differences. A picture is thus more depictive just in case it is seen as having fewer nondepictive features, whereas a nondepictive feature is individuated through the susceptibility of the picture's configuration to change without entailing any change in the picture's content.
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References found in this work BETA
Alon Chasid (2004). Why the Pictorial Relation is Not Reference. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):226-247.

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