In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press (2002)
|Abstract||There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim (about what can be known or conceived), from there to a modal claim (about what is possible or necessary), and from there to a metaphysical claim (about the nature of things in the world).|
|Keywords||Conceivability Epistemology Possibility|
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