Extensionalism and Scientific Theory in Quine's Philosophy

Abstract
In this article, I analyze Quine?s conception of science, which is a radical defence of extensionalism on the grounds that first?order logic is the most adequate logic for science. I examine some criticisms addressed to it, which show the role of modalities and probabilities in science and argue that Quine?s treatment of probability minimizes the intensional character of scientific language and methods by considering that probability is extensionalizable. But this extensionalizing leads to untenable results in some cases and is not consistent with the fact that Quine himself admits confirmation which includes probability. Quine?s extensionalism does not account for this fact and then seems unrealistic, even if science ought to be extensional in so far as it is descriptive and mathematically expressible
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References found in this work BETA
Jaakko Hintikka (1997). Three Dogmas of Quine's Empiricism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (202):457-477.

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