David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialogue 48 (01):145-183 (2009)
This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal module" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences.
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.) (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
John F. Boler (1963). Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism. Seattle, University of Washington Press.
R. F. Bornstein & T. S. Pittman (eds.) (1992). Perception Without Awareness. New York: Guilford Press.
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