Synthese 105 (3):273-301 (1995)
|Abstract||In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.|
|Keywords||Affect Computational Emotion Feeling Metaphysics Mind Modularity Representation|
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