Feeling and representing: Computational theory and the modularity of affect

Synthese 105 (3):273-301 (1995)
In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
Keywords Affect  Computational  Emotion  Feeling  Metaphysics  Mind  Modularity  Representation
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063560
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Citations of this work BETA
Sabine A. Döring (2003). Explaining Action by Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
Rick Anthony Furtak (2010). Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
Mikko Salmela (2006). True Emotions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.

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