David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness Bulletin (1999)
As I see it, the science of consciousness is all about relating _third-person data_ - about brain processes, behavior, environmental interaction, and the like - to _first-person data_ about conscious experience. I take it for granted that there are first-person data. It's a manifest fact about our minds that there is something it is like to be us - that we have subjective experiences - and that these subjective experiences are quite different at different times. Our direct knowledge of subjective experiences stems from our first-person access to them. And subjective experiences are arguably the central data that we want a science of consciousness to explain.
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Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88.
Alva Noë (2007). The Critique of Pure Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):231-245.
Vincian Gaillard, Muriel Vandenberghe, Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans (2006). First and Third-Person Approaches in Implicit Learning Research. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):709-722.
Eduard Marbach (2007). No Heterophenomenology Without Autophenomenology: Variations on a Theme of Mine. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):75-87.
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