Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence

Mind 120 (479):587 - 635 (2011)
The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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DOI 10.2307/41494373
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Jesse Fitts (2014). Chalmers on the Objects of Credence. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):343-358.
Dilip Ninan (2013). Self‐Location and Other‐Location. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):301-331.

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