Integrity and demandingness
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):255 - 265 (2007)
| Abstract | I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesDouglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Consequentialism. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethical Theory. Continuum.
Alexander Miller (1997). Lenin's Anticipation of Bernard Williams's Integrity Objection to Utilitarianism. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (4):503-510.
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David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (8):1-17.
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