Imagination, indexicality, and intensions [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90 (2004)
|Abstract||John Perry's book Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness is a lucid and engaging defense of a physicalist view of consciousness against various anti-physicalist arguments. In what follows, I will address Perry's responses to the three main anti-physicalist arguments he discusses: the zombie argument (focusing on imagination), the knowledge argument (focusing on indexicals), and the modal argument (focusing on intensions).|
|Keywords||Imagination Indexicality Intension Metaphysics Zombie|
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