Moral perception

Philosophy 83 (4):421-437 (2008)
Abstract
I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and ‘queerness’. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn (about supervenience) and J.L. Mackie (about motivation). The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains
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Citations of this work BETA
Timothy Chappell (2009). Ethics Beyond Moral Theory. Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):206-243.
Johan Brännmark (2009). Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):449 - 462.
J. Jeremy Wisnewski (forthcoming). The Case for Moral Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
Alex Barber (2013). Science's Immunity to Moral Refutation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.
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