Moral perception

Philosophy 83 (4):421-437 (2008)
Abstract
I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and ‘queerness’. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn and J.L. Mackie. The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains.
Keywords moral epistemology  patterns  moral realism  non-naturalism
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819108000818
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Citations of this work BETA
Timothy Chappell (2009). Ethics Beyond Moral Theory. Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):206-243.
Alex Barber (2013). Science's Immunity to Moral Refutation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.
David Faraci (2015). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
J. Jeremy Wisnewski (2015). The Case for Moral Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):129-148.

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