Of course, I don't say that!
|Abstract||Grice’s notion of what is said has been challenged in many directions and, since then, there are a lot of new proposals to understand it. One of these new proposals claims that what a speaker said is not part of the speaker meaning. In that sense, the content said by uttering a sentence is not intentioned by the speaker but a purely semantic and syntactic matter. Kent Bach argues for this proposal and is the main exponent of it. My aim will be to show that Bach’s arguments do not work. There are two different arguments in Bach (1994, 1999, 2001). The first, that I call the direct argument, gives us three reasons against the idea that what is said is meant by the speaker. My goal in the first section will be to show that these reasons are not conclusive. Bach’s notion of what is said should rest on the second argument, the indirect argument. In it, he argues that if what is said is not part of the communicative intentions of the speaker, then it is possible that the content said is not propositional. With this idea, Bach uses what he calls the IQ test..|
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Similar books and articles
Vojislav Bozickovic (2001). The Semantic Insignificance of Referential Intentions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):125-135.
Kent Bach (2005). Context Ex Machina. In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
Anne Bezuidenhout (2001). Metaphor and What is Said: A Defense of a Direct Expression View of Metaphor. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):156–186.
Kent Bach (2001). You Don't Say? Synthese 128 (1-2):15--44.
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Added to index2009-01-28
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