Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account

Noûs 45 (4):595-639 (2011)
When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00788.x
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Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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Chad Carmichael (2015). Deep Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1).

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