Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account

Noûs 45 (4):595-639 (2011)
Abstract
When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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References found in this work BETA
Diana Ackerman (1978). De Re Propositional Attitudes Toward Integers. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):145-153.
George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 71--125.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ben Blumson (2010). Pictures, Perspective and Possibility. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):135 - 151.

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