Platonistic and Disenchanting Theories of Ethics

Peter Lang (2007)
In this book I try to defend a traditional kind of dualism in regard to ethical theory. The idea is that Conscience and Self-love offer distinct but rational and reasonable objectives in our decision-making. When they conflict, pure reason does not resolve the issue. With this picture in mind, I argue that a kind of Platonistic realism in regard to morality is (still) intellectually permissible – has not yet been defeated. That is to say, it is permissible to hold that we ought to do what is morally right simply because it is morally right. We ought to do this even when Self-love is strongly opposed.
Keywords Realism in Ethics  Dualism in Ethics  Sidgwick  Butler  Anselm
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $29.95 used (68% off)   $89.50 new (3% off)   $91.95 direct from Amazon    Amazon page
ISBN(s) 0820488585   9780820488585
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,890
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

14 ( #180,136 of 1,725,310 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #349,101 of 1,725,310 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.