Platonistic and Disenchanting Theories of Ethics
Peter Lang (2007)
| Abstract | In this book I try to defend a traditional kind of dualism in regard to ethical theory. The idea is that Conscience and Self-love offer distinct but rational and reasonable objectives in our decision-making. When they conflict, pure reason does not resolve the issue. With this picture in mind, I argue that a kind of Platonistic realism in regard to morality is (still) intellectually permissible – has not yet been defeated. That is to say, it is permissible to hold that we ought to do what is morally right simply because it is morally right. We ought to do this even when Self-love is strongly opposed. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Realism in Ethics Dualism in Ethics Sidgwick Butler Anselm | |||||||||
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| Buy the book | $81.95 direct from Amazon $89.95 new Amazon page | |||||||||
| ISBN(s) | 0820488585 9780820488585 | |||||||||
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Ferdinand A. Hermens (1958). Ethics, Politics, and Power: Christian Realism and and Manichaean Dualism. Ethics 68 (4):246-259.
Anthony Skelton (2007). Schultz's Sidgwick. Utilitas 19 (1):91-103.
Robert W. Loftin (1992). Scientific Collecting. Environmental Ethics 14 (3):253-264.
Robert W. Loftin (1992). Scientific Collecting. Environmental Ethics 14 (3):253-264.
Michael S. Pritchard (1998). Sidgwick's Practical Ethics. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (2):147-151.
Francesco Orsi (2012). Sidgwick and the Morality of Purity. Revue d'Etudes Benthamiennes 10 (10).
Francesco Orsi (2008). The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses. Etica and Politica / Ethics & Politics 10 (2):19-41.
William Vaughan (2009). Platonistic and Disenchanting Theories of Ethics – by Hugh S. Chandler. Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):289-291.
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