Platonistic and Disenchanting Theories of Ethics

Peter Lang (2007)
Abstract In this book I try to defend a traditional kind of dualism in regard to ethical theory. The idea is that Conscience and Self-love offer distinct but rational and reasonable objectives in our decision-making. When they conflict, pure reason does not resolve the issue. With this picture in mind, I argue that a kind of Platonistic realism in regard to morality is (still) intellectually permissible – has not yet been defeated. That is to say, it is permissible to hold that we ought to do what is morally right simply because it is morally right. We ought to do this even when Self-love is strongly opposed.
Keywords Realism in Ethics  Dualism in Ethics  Sidgwick  Butler  Anselm
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ISBN(s) 0820488585   9780820488585
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