David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 49--125 (2006)
In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory.
|Keywords||Color Constancy Matching Perception Frege, Gottlob|
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Following a suggestion from Dave Chalmers, I am copying to here a query that I originally posted in the Epistemology thread. Dave will repost his answer and then I will follow up. I do have some questions about his answer that might be useful.
Dave, since you're still hanging on to this thread, may I change directions a bit and press the question I asked you when I was there? What I wanted to know was whether it was fair to characterize your position (in your Eden paper) as being that perceptions have conceptual content but do not have conceptual structure.
Clearly in that paper you are deliberating over whether perceptions have Russellian or Fregean or, your own invention, Edenic contents. These are all species of what I am calling conceptual contents. So as I am using the term, it seems to me clear that you think perceptions have conceptual content. The fact that you opt for Edenic content makes that, if anything, even clearer (since it's rather easier to see the ... (read more)