Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187 (2013)
|Abstract||In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views.|
|Keywords||ground source of normativity hybrid voluntarism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;commitment, Reasons, and the Will&Quot;. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Ruth Chang (2009). Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
Andrew Jason Cohen (2008). Existentialist Voluntarism as a Source of Normativity. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):89-129.
Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
William Lauinger (2013). The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):270-295.
Krist Vaesen (2006). How Norms in Technology Ought to Be Interpreted. Techne 10 (1):117-133.
R. Jay Wallace (ed.) (2006). Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Matthew S. Bedke (2012). The Ought-Is Gap: Trouble For Hybrid Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):657-670.
Christian Coons & David Faraci (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.
Camillia Kong (2012). The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):661-690.
Added to index2012-10-14
Total downloads157 ( #3,037 of 739,319 )
Recent downloads (6 months)41 ( #2,125 of 739,319 )
How can I increase my downloads?