David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187 (2013)
In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views.
|Keywords||ground source of normativity hybrid voluntarism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ruth Chang (2015). Transformative Choices. Res Philosophica 92 (2):237-282.
Ryan Kemp (2015). The Self-Transformation Puzzle: On the Possibility of Radical Self-Transformation. Res Philosophica 92 (2):389-417.
Rebecca Chan (2016). Religious Experience, Voluntarist Reasons, and the Transformative Experience Puzzle. Res Philosophica 93 (1):269-287.
Andrew T. Forcehimes (2015). A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
John Halstead (2015). The Impotence of the Value Pump. Utilitas 27 (2):195-216.
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