Commitment, Reasons, and the Will

This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you make a promise to x, then you have a reason to x’. Instead, internal commitments are that in virtue of which one has the special reasons of committed relationships; they are the grounds of such reasons. In this way, the will is a source of practical normativity.
Keywords source of normativity  hybrid voluntarism  commitment  reasons
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Ruth Chang (2015). Transformative Choices. Res Philosophica 92 (2):237-282.

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Similar books and articles
Ruth Chang (2009). Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press
Ken O'Day (1998). Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):61-87.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Might All Normativity Be Queer? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.
Derek Edyvane (2003). Against Unconditional Love. Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (1):59–75.

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