Self-awareness: Eliminating the myth of the “invisible subject”

Philosophy East and West 61 (3):453-467 (2011)
In the sixth century a.d., in a debate with the Buddhists about the nature of Self, the well-known Naiyāyika Uddyotakara declared that there is no need prove that the Self or what is referred to by the pronoun “I” exists, for on that score there cannot be any significant disagreement.1 It is only this or that specific metaphysical nature of the self that is the subject of controversy. To limit the scope of the debate at issue here, we employ the same strategy. It is beyond doubt that many cognitive processes involve consciousness of the self, for example monitoring one’s activities, as in learning how to dance or planning an important event in the near future. We can safely assume that there cannot be any ..
Keywords Reflexivity  Intrspectionism  Self-awareness
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DOI 10.1353/pew.2011.0041
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