David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy East and West 61 (3):453-467 (2011)
In the sixth century a.d., in a debate with the Buddhists about the nature of Self, the well-known Naiyāyika Uddyotakara declared that there is no need prove that the Self or what is referred to by the pronoun “I” exists, for on that score there cannot be any significant disagreement.1 It is only this or that specific metaphysical nature of the self that is the subject of controversy. To limit the scope of the debate at issue here, we employ the same strategy. It is beyond doubt that many cognitive processes involve consciousness of the self, for example monitoring one’s activities, as in learning how to dance or planning an important event in the near future. We can safely assume that there cannot be any ..
|Keywords||Reflexivity Intrspectionism Self-awareness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Monima Chadha (2013). The Self in Early Nyāya: A Minimal Conclusion. Asian Philosophy 23 (1):24-42.
Similar books and articles
Michael Kelly (2002). Self-Awareness and Ontological Monism. Idealistic Studies 32 (3):237-254.
Yuko Ishihara (2011). Later Nishida on Self-Awareness: Have I Lost Myself Yet? Asian Philosophy 21 (2):193 - 211.
Dan Zahavi (2000). Self and Consciousness. In Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins 55--74.
Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 157--180.
Robert W. Kentridge & Charles A. Heywood (2000). Metacognition and Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):308-312.
Ruth G. Millikan (2001). The Myth of Mental Indexicals. In Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.), Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11. John Benjamins
Christopher Peacocke (2005). Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press 298.
P. Cicogna & M. Bosinelli (2001). Consciousness During Dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):26-41.
Robert Arp (2007). Consciousness and Awareness - Switched-on Rheostats: A Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):101-106.
Christopher Peacocke (2006). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.
Christophe R. Menant, Performances of Self-Awareness Used to Explain the Evolutionary Advantages of Consciousness.
Michael Huemer (1998). A Direct Realist Account of Perceptual Awareness. Dissertation, Rutgers University
Iddo Landau (1991). The Role of Reflexivity in Philosophical Systems. Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
Added to index2011-07-24
Total downloads47 ( #72,555 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #183,615 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?