Self-Respect Regained

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):311-318 (2011)
In a recent article, David Christensen casts aspersions on a restricted version of van Fraassen's Reflection principle, which he dubs ‘Self-Respect’(sr). Rejecting two possible arguments for sr, he concludes that the principle does not constitute a requirement of rationality. In this paper we argue that not only has Christensen failed to make a case against the aforementioned arguments, but that considerations pertaining to Moore's paradox indicate that sr, or at the very least a mild weakening thereof, is indeed a plausible normative principle.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00311.x
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References found in this work BETA
C. van Fraassen (1984). Belief and the Will. Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
David Christensen (2007). Epistemic Self-Respect. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.

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