Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36 (1993)
In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to the conclusion that our concepts of qualitative mental states cannot be analyzed entirely in functional terms
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X00028715
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Diana I. Pérez (2004). Mental Concepts as Natural Kind Concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):201-225.

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