The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory

Oxford University Press (1996)
The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible (alas!), and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend a form of strong artificial intelligence and to analyze some problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Keywords Philosophy of mind  Consciousness  Mind and body  Dualism
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Call number BD418.3.C43 1996
ISBN(s) 0195117891   9780195117899  
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    Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.

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