David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102 (2005)
Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition and other related domains. An alternate philosophical hypothesis for addressing the issues is proposed. It is that emotion is a naturally occurring valenced phenomenon that is variously modifiable by psychological and cultural circumstances. This proposal should improve the chances for collaboration between philosophical and scientific researchers interested in emotion, something that has been notoriously absent from the present 'debate', which has mostly been a philosopher's game
|Keywords||Affect Demarcation Emotion Experience Metaphysics Valence Damasio, Antonio R Russell, James|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jelle de Boer (2014). Scaling Happiness. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):703-718.
Charles Starkey (2008). Classifying Emotions: Prospects for a Psychoevolutionary Approach. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):759 – 777.
Similar books and articles
P. M. S. Hacker (2009). The Conceptual Framework for the Investigation of Emotions. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan
Kirsten Walsh (2009). Has Laudan Killed the Demarcation Problem? Dissertation, University of Melbourne
Nico H. Frijda (2009). Emotion Experience and its Varieties. Emotion Review 1 (3):264-271.
P. Zachar (2000). Review of “the Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness” by Antonio Damasio and of “the Evolution of the Emotion-Processing Mind: With an Introduction to Mental Darwinism” by Robert Langs. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):181-187.
James Harold (2008). Immoralism and the Valence Constraint. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (1):45-64.
Dan Moller (2011). Anticipated Emotions and Emotional Valence. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (9).
Louis C. Charland (1997). Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotion: A Representational Proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.
Louis C. Charland (2005). Emotion Experience and the Indeterminacy of Valence. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press 231-254.
Louis Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
Giovanna Colombetti (2005). Appraising Valence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #150,511 of 1,724,852 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #59,662 of 1,724,852 )
How can I increase my downloads?